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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Premier Nikoyan's visit to the United States with Jan on November 19

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Nikoyan on November 19 at 10 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Nikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Gorynia and by his interpreter, Mr. Vlasov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson, and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Nikoyan. (Attachment 1)

We agree with Mr. McCloy's suggestion that you may wish to make the following points clear on Cuba.

a. There is a considerable record of conciliation and performance on both sides and the Soviets should not become unreasonable at this time just because of their difficulties with Castro.

b. We cannot give up our overflights, which everyone in the Western Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.

c. The kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is the most that a President can constitutionally agree to, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and the safeguards which were agreed to in your correspondence with Khrushchev.

7 d. It would be useful to both sides to wind up the matter quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to haggle over every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans wish to normalize relations, we are ready and willing to talk with them about it. You may wish to discourage Nikoyan from discussing future Cuban-Western Hemisphere relations on the grounds that Castro should know what is necessary for Cuba to improve its relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. A position paper on this point and a paper on Chinese Communist influence in Cuba are attached (Attachments 2 and 3).

You may wish to make the following points regarding the Sino-Indian dispute. A position paper is attached (Attachment 4).

a. The United States is assisting India to meet its defense requirements at the specific request of the Government of India.

b. United States assistance is designed to permit India to maintain its territorial integrity. It, therefore, does not constitute a threat to Communist China.

c. The United States would like to see peace restored but not on terms imposed by force by Communist China.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(A), 5(D) AND 11

State NLK-77-1068
DATE 5-24-78

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(Page One)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment
with You on November 29

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 29 at 4:30 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan.

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We do not believe it desirable for you to raise the subject of Berlin. Should Mikoyan raise it, you may wish to discuss the problem along the lines of the instruction sent Ambassador Konler for his talk with Semenov (copy attached, attachment 5).

Regarding Laos, you may wish to remind Mikoyan that in your talks with Khrushchev in Vienna and in subsequent talks between Harriman and Pushkin in Geneva, the Soviet Union committed itself to obtain two things which are of vital interest to the United States: the cessation of Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The final international agreement embodying these understandings was signed on July 23 of this year. Our information is clear that neither of the two promises has been fulfilled.

We are also particularly concerned over the recent unwarranted attack by the Pathet Lao on an Air America plane attempting to deliver rice to the Plaine des Jarres. This attack, which resulted in the death of both the pilot and co-pilot, is a direct challenge to the authority of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who requested the flight.

The United States engagement in Southeast Asia is most serious and, consequently, fulfillment of Soviet pledges there is of first importance. A position paper is attached (attachment 6).

Regarding a nuclear test ban, you may wish to point out that it is imperative that the nuclear powers reach early agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. We are now ready to conclude an agreement banning tests in outer space, the atmosphere and underwater without prejudice to the continuing effort to reach agreement on banning underground tests. It is our firm view that agreement on the banning of underground tests should involve the principle of on-site inspection.

In connection with these steps, we would be interested in learning what possibilities the Soviet Government envisages of inducing Communist China to adhere to whatever nuclear test ban may be agreed on.

Regarding measures to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation, you may wish to note that Ambassador Dean has mentioned to the Soviet delegation in Geneva that there appear to be certain measures designed to reduce the risk of war concerning which a substantial amount of similarity already exists between our two countries. We have in mind such measures as (1) the establishment of improved communications between your side and ours, (2) advance notification regarding major military movements and (3) the exchange of military missions between our states, or groups of states, respectively. We are interested in exploring the prospects of agreement on these or similar measures designed to achieve

the same.

the same end. We have heard that the USSR may again be interested in observation posts. We wonder if the Soviet Government has any further views on this matter. You might wish to state that if the Soviet Government were interested in proceeding with an arrangement for mutual exchange of observation posts apart from stage one of a disarmament agreement we would be glad to discuss such a plan.

If the Soviet Government agrees, we would like to give joint notification to the Acting Secretary General of the UN in the near future concerning the program for US-Soviet cooperation in outer space which was worked out by Dr. Dryden and Professor Sigenrakov. If such notification is agreeable to the Soviet side, we would anticipate moving shortly thereafter to practical steps for implementing the program. A position paper is attached (attachment 7).

There are no strictly bilateral issues which merit being raised by you in this conversation. However it is possible that Mikoyan may raise the question of US-USSR Civil Air Agreement which was initialled but not signed in August 1961. A background memorandum on the subject is attached (attachment 8). Should Mikoyan urge that the agreement be signed now, you may wish to reply that after a satisfactory Cuban settlement has been reached and if progress can be made in one or two other fields, then the time may be ripe to sign the agreement.

Mikoyan may also raise the question of increased trade between the United States and the USSR. You may wish to reply that given the current state of our relations, it is understandable that American businessmen are reluctant to enter into extensive business relations with the USSR. An improvement in the political climate would probably lead to increased trade between our two countries.

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Biographic sketch of A. I. Mikoyan.
2. Cuba - United States Relations.
3. Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba.
4. Sino Indian Border Conflict.
5. Copy of telegram to Moscow regarding Kohler talk with Semenov.
6. Laos.
7. Background of US-USSR Outer Space Cooperation.
8. US-Soviet Bilateral Air Agreement.

SECRET

Verbatim copy of telegram to Moscow

Re: Moscow's 1949

SECRET DISTRIBUTION- 3/2

1. We have assumed that in West-Cuba phase discussions might show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) were likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for time being.

2. Although certain aspects of Cuban situation remain unresolved, we want to take advantage of opportunity provided by Semenov's opening to initiate probe present direction of Soviet thinking on Berlin. (While you should make clear at outset that you are undertaking talks with him on personal basis without any governmental commitment although both you and he will presumably be reporting to your principals, we realistically assume that you will be regarded as speaking on basis of at least general instructions.)

3. A solid settlement in Berlin on terms that keep the city free and viable is a target of high priority for us, and we do not wish to miss any opportunity that may now exist for a Berlin settlement. You should maintain the position that since the Soviet Government started the Berlin crisis, the initiative for new proposals should rest with Moscow, but you should leave no doubt that we are much interested in a workable settlement. You should point out that we see no good in facing difficult negotiations with Germans and French except in terms of a real prospect of settlement.

4. As we see it, there are two broad possibilities for such a settlement. One is a de facto continuation of the status quo, in which any peace treaty would leave the real situation unchanged, and each side would interpret the position in its own way. This is probably easier to negotiate but less satisfactory for the long pull than a broader settlement. The terms of a wider agreement must include for us plainly acknowledged right of Western troop presence and improved access rights like those proposed under our international access authority. A number of adjustments of interest to the Soviets could be made in return for improved access and wholly acknowledged presence. Without communicating all of the above to Semenov, you should make it plain to him that any Berlin settlement which shifts from the status quo must include advantages for us as well as for them, and that the advantages of greatest interest to us are improved access and a wholly acknowledged right of Western presence. It would be appropriate to indicate that we would be interested in knowing how Soviets would conduct a wider agreement including these two features.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 3(D), 5(E) AND 11

State (100-77-1068)
NY 100-77-1068
N.S. D-12 5/24/78

(Page Nine)

Verbatim Copy of Telegram to Moscow

Ref: Moscow 1389

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks in Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for the time being.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this point, you should also endeavor to [word illeg] him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba in that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any chances are consistent with safe-guarding of those vital interests.

7.

f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence - as for example access or perforation of wall. You should probe as to the role and authority of West Berlin Senate, Western garrison and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a U.S. position on such possibilities.

3. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this point, you should also endeavor to draw him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problems. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, appropriate caveat should be that we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in order to examine possibilities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of those vital interests.

6. A further point which it might be useful to probe would be role now assigned to peace treaty by Soviets. We have noted recent de-emphasis of peace treaty in both Soviet and GDR statements. Semenov will undoubtedly continue to pay lip service to peace treaty, but we would be interested in your impressions from talking with him that this is definitely on back burner.

7. We are much interested in Khrushchev's recent conversation with Ambassador Roberts and his suggestion that troops might remain temporarily under a certain unspecified UN role. In the degree that this could be a face-saver for Soviets while Allied troop presence and guarantee remain, this proposal is of real interest to us. A major purpose of your talks with Semenov should therefore be to ascertain whether this suggestion represents a real shift in the Soviet position or is merely a device for limiting both the duration and the effectiveness of Western presence. You should make it clear that we cannot express any judgment on what they have in mind until they have spelled it out. You might, for example, seek to determine what the Soviets have in mind among such possibilities (without offering them a catalog for shopping) as following: (a) simple registration of any agreement on Berlin with UN, (b) agreement to report to UN on such matters as the size, composition, and activities of forces in Berlin, (c) some form of UN representation and authority in West Berlin, (d) some new status involving West Berlin request for Allied troops under some UN umbrella, (e) move of elements of UN itself to West Berlin, (f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence - as for example access or perforation of Wall. You should probe as to the role and authority of West Berlin Senate, Western garrisons, and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our own guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a U.S. position on such possibilities.

8. You are familiar with standard arguments made repeatedly by Secretary in his numerous conversations with Soviets over past 16 months. To extent you deem desirable, you should repeat these arguments as appropriate. He

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PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

would want to avoid giving impression that our position has weakened [words illeg] on what we have defined as our vital interest in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable man whose strength and restraint have both been demonstrated.

9. We building [word illeg] should [word illeg] for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgement as to whether to pursue it by discrete questioning.

...that we have learned in our own experience in this situation. Our position is that of reasonable and honest strength and to maintain that both have been created.

9. We believe foregoing should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as to whether to pursue it by discreet questioning.

10. We would hope that you could have lunch with Semenov without this getting to press corps. While we accept inevitability of your having to brief French, British, and German colleagues, at least in general, on your discussion, we would also hope that information could be limited to them. In talking with them, you should be careful to avoid giving impression that you are in any way negotiating rather than engaging purely in probing operation on informal basis at Soviet initiative. President is dubious about possibility of carrying out really useful exchanges with Soviets if we follow usual procedure of full briefings for three and then for NATO. In past, this has led either to leaks and public discussion of Allied differences before reactions of Soviets have been ascertained, or to debate within Alliance on theoretical points which have not played role in talks with Soviets. While President is therefore, prepared to have you initiate probe with Semenov, at appropriate point he may wish to use other channels.